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ABSTRACT
________________________________________________________________
The primary task of archaeological heritage management is to represent the
public interest in archaeology. How this is constituted and determined has
changed significantly over the past 200 years. As this paper demonstrates, a
modern, egalitarian, democratic approach has yet to be established within
Austrian and German archaeological heritage management: the relationship
between heritage management bureaucracy and the civic subject is
anachronistic, stuck in a pre-1848 Revolution mindset. Due to the lack of a
public discourse and the nature of scholarly engagement with
archaeological heritage management, the power of (state) archaeologists is
not imaginary, but very real.
________________________________________________________________
Re´sume´: La taˆche primordiale de la gestion du patrimoine arche´ologique est
de repre´senter l’inte´reˆt public pour l’arche´ologie. La manie`re dont ceci est
constitue´ et de´termine´ a fait l’objet de changements significatifs au cours
des 200 dernie`res anne´es. Ainsi que cet article le de´montre, une approche
moderne, e´galitaire et de´mocratique doit encore eˆtre e´tablie au sein de la
gestion du patrimoine arche´ologique autrichien et allemand: la relation
entre la bureaucratie de la gestion du patrimoine et le sujet civique est
anachronique, bloque´e dans un e´tat d’esprit datant d’avant la re´volution de
1848. En raison de l’absence d’un discours public et de la nature de
l’implication acade´mique en faveur de la gestion du patrimoine
arche´ologique, le pouvoir des arche´ologues (de l’e´tat) n’est pas imaginaire,
mais tre`s re´el.
________________________________________________________________
Resumen: La tarea principal de la administracio´n del patrimonio
arqueolo´gico es representar el intere´s pu´blico en la arqueologı´a. Co´mo se
constituye y determina esto ha cambiado significativamente en los u´ltimos
200 an˜os. Como lo demuestra este artı´culo, au´n no se ha establecido un
enfoque moderno, igualitario y democra´tico dentro de la administracio´n del
patrimonio arqueolo´gico austrı´aco y alema´n: la relacio´n entre la burocracia
administrativa del patrimonio y el tema cı´vico es anacro´nica, atrapada en
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una mentalidad anterior a la revolucio´n de 1848. Debido a la falta de un
discurso pu´blico y la naturaleza del compromiso acade´mico con la
administracio´n del patrimonio arqueolo´gico, el poder de los arqueo´logos
(estatales) no es imaginario, sino muy real.
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
KEY WORDS
Law, Policy, Practice
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
It should not come as a surprise that, as archaeologists, we have an interest
in the preservation of sources used to study the past: after all, they are
essential to the research we do. While our motives may be noble—we may
well want to serve the common good by preserving, studying and interpret-
ing archaeology ‘on behalf of and for the benefit of present and future gener-
ations’ (ICOMOS 1990, 1)—strictly speaking, when arguing for the
preservation (and study) of the archaeology, we act—at least partly—out
of self-interest.
As a consequence, the power relationships between professional archae-
ologists and other stakeholders with justified, legal or other, interests in
archaeology are particularly important in discourses about the public inter-
est in archaeology (Karl 2016; cf. Art. 2 ICOMOS 1990; Art. 4 c and 5 a
CoE 2005a, b, 7). After all, the primary task of archaeological heritage
management is to balance, through public administration, private interests
of any individual stakeholders with competing public interests which may
affect archaeology.1 How public interest is determined, and who gets to
determine it, and how it compares to other justified interests, is thus essen-
tial for whether archaeological structures and objects will be preserved
in situ or by record, consequently studied in accordance with our self-in-
terest, or left to whatever fate competing (other) private or public interests
may hold for it.
The Public Interest
How public interest in archaeology should be determined, and by who, has
changed significantly since archaeology emerged as an academic discipline,
and archaeological heritage management became a function of public
administration, in the 19th century. Within authoritarian societies during
this early period, it was still deemed self-evident that it was to be deter-
mined top-down, by the ruling elite. This was justified by the belief that
the ruling elite was composed of ‘the best’ members of society (Bloch
1961; Elias 1997). Whether they had been put in their place of authority
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by divine grace, as in the case of the Emperor, or due to noble birth or
other suitable qualities (e.g. being ‘learned’ in the relevant subject matter)
by the Emperor, they were deemed to have not just the right, but indeed
the duty, to autocratically decide what was in the public interest (see Wat-
zlawick 2001: 101–5). Everyone else under this ruling elite, that is, the sub-
jects of the respective Emperor, had to listen and obey. This model of
social organisation, characteristic for absolute monarchies and dictator-
ships, was dominant in Europe until the 20th century, and only then
started slowly to decline. In Austria and Germany, it remained dominant,
with some minor interruptions in the late nineteenth and early 20th cen-
tury, until 1945.
However, with the rise of modern democracies, the determination of
public interests significantly changed. Under this much more liberal–egali-
tarian model of organising societies, power is imagined to emanate from
‘the people’, with public interest to be determined bottom-up: the role of
the state, and its officials, is only to balance the diverse interests of it citi-
zens, rather than dictate to its citizens what is in their best interest (Haber-
mas 1992). Based on the ideals of the Enlightenment (e.g. Kant 1784, 481),
its ‘responsible citizens’ are supposed to decide for themselves what is in
their, and by extension the public, interest. Ideally, the discourse by which
this democratic public interest is determined should be one where each
participant has equal power to contribute effectively his interests. The
state’s officials, on the other hand, must not restrict nor interfere with this
discourse and implement its outcomes disinterestedly without fail, even if
it is the opposite of what they themselves believe to be best for everyone
(Habermas 1992, 249). This constitutes a complete role reversal: rather
than having (and being) the authority entitled to determine what is best
for everyone, public servants have to implement the collective decisions of
the citizens. This role to place citizens at the heart of decisions is embed-
ded in Austria and Germany’s Constitutions, as in Article 1 of the Austrian
Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz, first passed in 1923, and Article 20 of the German
Grundgesetz, passed after the end of World War 2.
To determine whether archaeological heritage management in Austria
and Germany corresponds more closely with the former or the latter model
of social organisation, examining how (public) discourses regarding archae-
ology are ordered is particularly significant. After all, the order of the dis-
course determines who can contribute and who is excluded from, and
what can and cannot be said in it (Foucault 2000, 10–30). If discourses are
ordered in a manner excluding segments of society from participation, this
is in keeping with the former, authoritarian-hierarchical system of social
organisation. This indicates that the elite controlling such a discourse has
immense power, even if it itself believes it is powerless. Furthermore, if that
elite has been entrusted with (legal) authority by the state to act on behalf
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of and in the best interest of ‘the public’, with the potential of using given
authority to advance its own at the expense of other individual and collec-
tive interests, this can lead to abuses of power. The risk for the latter
occurring is especially high if members of this elite assume they know and
thus believe they are entitled to decide on behalf of all others, what is best
for them, even against their wishes (Watzlawick 2001). If such an elite does
(ab)use the authority it has been entrusted with for its own utility, it does
not act in the public interest, but is damaging it and the very fabric of the
societies we live in (see Art. XII French Declaration of the Rights of Man,
AN 1789).
A Common Misconception About ‘the’ Public Interest
in Archaeology
There is a common misconception among, not just Germanophone,
archaeologists about ‘the’ public interest in archaeology: that it has been
fixed immutably in law that (all) archaeology has to be preserved (ideally
completely unchanged in situ) for the study by (primarily) future genera-
tions. This not only seems to be confirmed by a cursory reading of the rel-
evant state or national laws themselves (e.g. § 1, 8 and 21 DSchG-BW; § 4
(1), 5 (1) and 11 (1, 5) DMSG), but also by the legal commentaries and
relevant case law (e.g. Strobl and Sieche 2010, 49; Bazil et al. 2015, 16, 42–
3) and international treaties like the Lausanne Charter or the Valletta Con-
vention (ICOMOS 1990, 1; Art. 1 (1) CoE 1992). The interest in preserva-
tion is even seen as outweighing the study of archaeology, at least by
invasive methods (explicitly so, e.g. Strobl and Sieche 2010, 265–7); some-
times explicitly justified with the argument that ‘future generations’ of
archaeologists will have better, less destructive methods at their disposal
than we today (e.g. Brunecker 2008, 16).
Yet, upon more careful examination, this turns out to be an overly sim-
plistic reading: neither in state, national nor international law is ‘the public
interest’ clearly determined to be the ‘preservation of (all) archaeology’.
Rather, it is the other way around: archaeological heritage is protected by
law if there is a public interest in its preservation. And normally, by no
means all archaeology is archaeological heritage (or, if using German ter-
minology, a Denkmal), but only such archaeology which is of sufficient
(e.g. historical, scientific, artistic, cultural, etc.) significance (or value) that
its (unchanged) preservation is actually in the public interest (e.g. § 1 (1)
DMSG; § 2 (1) DSchG-BW). Nor is it only in the preservation of archaeo-
logical heritage that there is a public interest. Rather, many laws and inter-
national treaties give equal or even greater weight to a public interest in its
scientific study or in its meaningful use (e.g. § 1 (1) Denkmalschutzgesetz
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Nordrhein-Westfalen (DSchG-NRW; cf. Davydov et al. 2016, 46–7), e.g. for
enhancing the collective cultural memory (Art. 1 (1) CoE 1992). Thus,
there is not just one public interest being ‘the preservation of (all) archae-
ology’, but there are several public interests in archaeology, at least the
three listed above, and possibly many more.
In modern democratic states, the ‘public interest’ is a precondition for
any state action (Ha¨felin and Mu¨ller 2002, 113) and thus an instrument
used mainly in public law and administration. Its purpose is to enable the
state to protect the ‘common good’ (the—usually many and diverse—indi-
vidual interests of an undetermined collective; a ‘public’) from threats
(Steiner 2006, 193), e.g. from potential damage caused (to the interests of
this collective) if a specific individual (or group thereof) were to fulfil one
of their (‘private’) legal interests. Given that specific individuals party to
them can represent their own interests in administrative proceedings, while
the ‘public’ whose interests might be adversely affected cannot, the state
must represent the latter. This ensures that individuals cannot reap the
benefits of fulfilling their own interests while burdening an undetermined
collective of others with the costs or damages caused by their actions. The
public interest binds all three branches of the state: the legislature determi-
nes in abstract form what it considers to be in the public interest, while
the administrative and judicial branch has to implement the public interest
as determined in law on a case by case basis (Ha¨felin and Mu¨ller 2002,
116). Thus, if a conflict between two or several legal private and/or public
interests exists, the latter two branches have to balance them against each
other based on the principle of proportionality (Berka 1999, 156–67).
Where archaeological heritage (but not necessarily all archaeology) is
concerned, the legislature has determined by means of heritage protection
laws a public interest in the preservation (and possibly the study, meaning-
ful use, etc.) of archaeology which meets the stated legal criteria (of signifi-
cance) (e.g. § 1 (1–2) DMSG; § 2 (1) DSchG-BW; § 1 (1) DSchG-NRW).
However, there are many other justified private and public interests deter-
mined in other law which may equally be ‘in’ archaeology. For instance,
any landowner with archaeology on their property, irrespective of who
owns that archaeology, has justified private interests in that archaeology
because it affects his property rights. Also, since the right to property is a
human and civil right and the protection of such rights is also a public
interest (Ha¨felin and Mu¨ller 2002, 117–8), any landowner’s right to do
with their property as they will is not just their private, but also a pro-
tected public interest. Thus, when a conflict between the interests of the
landowner and heritage protection arises, the state must balance the private
interest of the landowner and a public interest in the protection of his
right to property against a public interest in the protection of the archaeo-
logical heritage. There are two conflicting public interests in the archaeol-
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ogy in such a case: that in protecting the right of the landowner to do with
it as he wishes and that in protecting archaeological heritage.
Indeed, these conflicting interests can even be reversed: if there is a pub-
lic interest in examining by excavation some archaeology, it can conflict
with a private interest of its owner to preserve it unchanged in situ. In
such a case, a public interest in studying the archaeology needs to be bal-
anced against a private interest of its owner and a public interest in the
protection of his right to property. And indeed, most Germanophone her-
itage laws contain specific provisions allowing heritage authorities to con-
duct such research into archaeology even against the wishes of its owner
(e.g. § 30 (1) DMSG; § 10 (2) DSchG-BW; & 28 (2) DSchG-NRW).
If we follow this logic, a public interest in the study of archaeology by
academic research and a public interest in its preservation can be mutually
exclusive. In any such conflict, the prevailing public interest in archaeology
must be whatever the interests of any undetermined collective require,
whether it is their protection against threats caused by any (‘private’) inter-
ests of any particular individual (or group thereof), or by any other public
interests. That public interest in archaeology should be determined in
modern democratic societies discursively, with all individuals concerned
being given a fair chance to make themselves heard and represent their
interests, both where the determination of public interests by the legislature
is concerned and in administrative and judicial proceedings.
The Germanophone Heritage Discourse
Since we archaeologists tend to believe we know what is best for the
archaeology, are self-interested because we need it for our research, and
have been given authority by the state to represent the public interest, it is
important to consider our role in this (public) heritage discourse. Thus, in
the following, I will examine the order of the Germanophone public
archaeological heritage discourse and the power relationships between ‘ex-
pert’ authorities and ordinary citizens.
While there certainly is such a discourse, the extent to which it can be
described as a public discourse is questionable. In Germany at least, follow-
ing a ‘polemic’ by Dieter Hoffmann-Axthelm (2000) questioning the role
of the state in heritage management for the Green parliamentary party, a
wide-ranging debate in public media ensued. Yet, most contributions to it
came from professional heritage managers, with only a few from volunteers
working for state heritage agencies, and hardly any contributions to that
debate concerned themselves with archaeological heritage management
(Donath 2000). In Austria, by comparison, not even devastating findings of
the Austrian Court of Audit (RH 2017) regarding the performance and
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lack of transparency of the Austrian National Heritage Agency led to any
significant published, let alone a truly public, debate about (archaeological)
heritage management.
This is not due to a lack of interest among members of the public (Karl
et al. 2014, 19; Siegmund et al. 2017, 244). Rather, while there are many
charities and individuals with an interest in heritage, by and large, they
seem unable to make themselves heard or meaningfully contribute to a
public discourse about heritage management or public interests in archaeo-
logical heritage (see, for example, Burghart 2015; Baumgartner 2015; cf.
Kemper 2017).
In fact, even within the archaeological disciplines, discourse seems
mostly subdued and stifled as it is hardly a free and equal discourse
according to Habermas’ (1992, 249) criteria. Even state archaeological her-
itage managers admit openly to this: ‘The lack of a debate of the founda-
tions of archaeological heritage management is due to a general consensus
of all participating experts since about two centuries’ (Pollak 2011, 227).2
This consensus leads to a uniform approach to archaeological heritage
management, mainly by means of the instruments of heritage law, across
all Germanophone jurisdictions: professional archaeologists believe we have
to protect the archaeology ‘… by means of the law in the interest of all …
from the grasp of all’ (Lu¨th 2006, 102).3
Determining the Public Interest
In practice, this leads to a system in which all decision-making powers
regarding the determination of the public interest rest almost exclusively
with state authorities. There are hardly any means for non-professionals,
and even most professionals, to be meaningfully incorporated in decision-
making processes, let alone to influence decisions. Instead, the law is inter-
preted as containing a general requirement to report all finds of anything
which ‘could’ be archaeology to the authorities (e.g. § 8 DMSG, § 20
DSchG-BW), and for all archaeological field research—sometimes even
including purely visual, non-invasive searches—to be explicitly permitted
by them (e.g. § 11 DMSG, § 21 DSchG-BW). Whether there is a public
interest in this (potential) archaeology at all, or what this interest might
be, in many cases is not even properly considered, nor properly balanced
against other stakeholder interests (see, for example, Karl 2019a, 8–27).
The authority to make any decisions regarding what is archaeology,
what is archaeological heritage, and what actions affecting either are in the
public interest rests preferably with the state archaeologists or depends
exclusively on expert opinions (explicitly, e.g. Bazil et al. 2015, 22–3; Strobl
and Sieche 2010, 73–4). This authority then is used by heritage officials to
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discursively restrict (e.g. Strobl and Sieche 2010, 266–7) even constitution-
ally protected, unconditional civil liberties like the freedom of research (in
Austria, by Art. 17 Staatsgrundgesetz; in Germany by Art 5 (3) Grundgesetz;
cf. Berka 1999, 342–7; Jarass and Pieroth 2016, 238–48), even in cases
where there is no indication that any public interest in the preservation of
any archaeological heritage could be adversely affected by it. At the same
time, they explicitly argue that heritage law contains a ‘state research privi-
lege’ (Strobl and Sieche 2010, 265),4 which conveniently, (only) state
archaeologists can exercise. Even more conveniently, such ‘state research’ is
argued to be exempt from heritage protection-related permit requirements
even if not exempted by law; e.g. with the rather spurious argument that
‘it would be nonsensical if the state heritage agency would have to issue for-
mal permits to itself’(Strobl and Sieche 2010, 269).5
A perfect exemplar of Smith’s (2006, 29–34) Authorised Heritage Dis-
course, dissenting views about what is in the public interest and how it is
to be determined are even repressed within the academic discourse, not
least by a highly hierarchical order even among professionals (Karl 2010,
120–42), and even more so with non-professionals. Based on the most cur-
sory of analyses, individuals are divided into different groups according to
a handful of questionable criteria, and based on this are collectively consid-
ered to be good, morally dubious, or evil (Fig. 1). The further to the right
the group is shown on Fig. 1 that individuals are assigned to, the less
authority is given to their opinions and the less value to their interests;
with those of groups on the far right apparently not needing to be consid-
ered at all (even where they are fully legally justified).
Euphemisms and Devaluations
This discourse is also characterised by a highly selective use of euphemisms
for our own, and derogatory terms for the activities and interests of others
(e.g. developers, metal detectorists, collectors, and art dealers). This selec-
tive framing further exposes the inherent power imbalance between differ-
ent groups affected by, but only partially being able to participate in, this
discourse.
For instance, professional archaeological excavations are always referred
to with very positive terms, whether as, ‘research excavations’6, ‘rescue
excavations’7, ‘emergency recovery’8, etc., leading to ‘preservation by
record’9; rather than as the ‘partially recorded destruction’ of the affected
archaeology, which would equally be possible and arguably much more
accurate. This is especially so given that it is common professional practice
to machine-strip at least the topsoil, often unsearched (Karl 2019b, 9–11),
and at least occasionally to partially machine-excavate undisturbed strata
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or apply radical sampling strategies where the excavation of certain types
of features or even whole sites is concerned (Siegmund and Scherzler 2014,
172).
In stark contrast to this, intentional finds recovery by non-professionals,
especially if ‘unauthorised’, is almost invariably referred to by negatively
loaded terms like ‘robbery dig’10, ‘looting’11, etc.; rather than as ‘unsystem-
atic finds recovery’, which would equally be possible. Indeed, the term
‘robbery digger’ is frequently indiscriminately used for all metal detectorists
without giving any consideration to the actions of any individual so
branded. This paints with the same brush those who clandestinely extract
archaeology ex situ (e.g. dig up archaeological heritage without a state per-
mit where legally required to have one, without landowner consent, and/or
without complying with compulsory finds reporting duties, etc.), and those
who engage in archaeological fieldwork with a permit by the relevant her-
itage agency (i.e. who lawfully exercise their constitutionally guaranteed
civil right to conduct research). This is despite the fact that comparatively
little discernible damage seems to be done by non-professional finds
Figure 1. The hierarchical order of authority in the Germanophone archaeological
heritage discourse. The further to the left the group an individual belongs to is
situated, the higher their authority, with the opinions and interests of all groups
classed as partially or exclusively ‘evil’ being disregarded completely. Assignment of
individuals to particular groups is partially based on whether they have professional
training, partially on their (assumed) motives for engaging with archaeology, and
partially on the (assumed) legality (or illegality) of their actions (adapted from Karl
2016, 4). X = always meets criterion, x = may meet criterion. Moral quality ascribed to
criteria: Green = positive, Yellow = neutral, Red = negative.
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extraction to ‘undisturbed’ archaeological contexts, and that c. 99% of
finds made by non-professionals seems to be recovered from the topsoil,
which would most probably be removed by mechanical digger during pro-
fessional excavations at the same spot (Karl 2019b, 11–22). Indeed, it is
even despite the fact that recording standards attached as conditions to
heritage agency permits for non-professional recovery of small finds from
the topsoil can require permit holders to record much more information
about recovered finds and their contexts than those attached to profes-
sional fieldwork permits (compare, for example, the recording standards
attached as conditions to metal detecting permits in Hesse, LfDH n.d., with
those attached to professional archaeological fieldwork permits, LfDH
2017).
Perhaps even worse than that, many professional archaeologists deploy
dehumanising language when referring to non-professionals. Whether it is
individuals which pursue entirely justified archaeological research interests
of their own lawfully, or whether it is such engaging in clandestine finds
extraction, they are literally referred to as animals: ‘homeland stags’12,
‘(black) sheep’13, etc. (cf. ‘lonely wolves’ in Norway, Rasmussen 2014, 90–
2; ‘nighthawks’ in the UK, Oxford Archaeology 2009). Such inappropriate
language, especially if, as it is, also applied to citizens engaging in entirely
lawful activities to exercise a fundamental human right (see Art. 27 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights; UN 1948), discursively devalues the
justified legal interests of these citizens.
Given that respect for and protection of human dignity is the highest
constitutional value of the German Grundgesetz (Jarass & Pieroth 2016,
41), with inviolable and inalienable human rights explicitly defined as the
foundation of any human society, peace and justice (Art. 1 (2) Grundge-
setz), with the same principle being the foundation of the Austrian state
(Berka 1999, 1–3), this framing seems hardly consistent with what should
be expected in a free public discourse between equal citizens. Rather than a
means to establish what is in the public interest where archaeology is con-
cerned, this discourse seems to be subverted by us ‘experts’ to undermine
the most important public interest of liberal-egalitarian democratic soci-
eties: to preserve human dignity.
Experts Rule
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that ‘the public’—or rather, the
many different stakeholders who may have justified legal interests in
archaeology, and thus also in being heard in determining what the public
interests in archaeology are (and how heavily they weigh when balanced
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against other public and private interests)—are also almost completely
excluded from the legal discourse about heritage.
Where legislation is concerned, while in democratic countries like Aus-
tria and Germany, citizens have the right to vote in elections, political par-
ties rarely publish clear statements about what (changes to) public interests
in archaeology they might wish to implement when elected. Thus, even
voting rights are mostly meaningless where influencing the public interests
in archaeology as determined in legislation is concerned.
Heritage laws are developed and written mostly by the heritage agencies
or at least in close consultation with them by the relevant ministry, that is,
by heritage bureaucrats. Almost invariably, these either are, or at least draw
strongly on the expertise of, heritage professionals. Other stakeholder
groups are rarely consulted during the drafting of (changes to) the law,
least of all ‘ordinary’ citizens or interest groups lacking a strong lobby (e.g.
‘volunteers’, ‘consumers’, and ‘metal detectorists’ in Fig. 1). In most of the
German states, there is at least a public consultation on the final drafts of
laws, though these are hardly advertised widely, and it is questionable
whether any submissions by members of the public are seriously consid-
ered by the relevant legislature. Speaking from experience of participating
in several such consultations, I have yet to see one where any submission
by any individual or (non-professional) civil society organisation has led to
changes, let alone significant ones, even where a significant percentage or
even majority of such submissions argued for the same or very similar
changes (also see DGUF 2016, which arrives at the same conclusion). In
Austria, where heritage legislation is a responsibility of the federal state,
there was not even a public consultation process until September 2017
(Parlament n.d.). In effect, interested citizens simply are not party to the
legislative process, at least not in any meaningful way.
Experts on the other hand, especially those in heritage agencies, do have
significant powers to influence the legislative process. This is evident when
looking at changes to Austrian archaeological heritage law, introduced in
the 1999 revision of the DMSG. The particular change in question con-
cerned the eligibility to be issued a field research permit, which until this
revision could be granted to everyone (provided they could demonstrate
the competence necessary for exercising the freedom of research). In the
1999 revision of the relevant provision of the law, § 11 (1) DMSG, the
possibility to be granted such a permit was restricted to archaeology gradu-
ates exclusively. As a justification for this change, the explanatory report to
the government draft of the law explains: ‘The regulation included in the
1990 revision, that … archaeological field research permits can also be
issued to persons who do not hold an appropriate academic degree was
struck off, since it has become out-dated: new models under the direction
of fully trained archaeologists (resp. pre- and protohistorians) have since
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successfully been tried and tested.’ (RV 1999, 55)14. It is self-evident that
just one particular interest group—archaeology graduates—benefits from
this change, while it is massively detrimental to all other (at least c.
99.85% of all) Austrian citizens, whose freedom of archaeological field
research is entirely removed by this provision.
Putting it bluntly, it is us archaeologists who write archaeological her-
itage laws, laws which, if at all, are then modified by major lobbies (of
developers, large landowners, etc.) with direct access to politicians. Ordi-
nary citizens and civil society, on the other hand, have virtually no chance
to influence the legislative process and thus are not heard in the process of
determining what the public interests in archaeology are.
Interpreting the Law
Pretty much the same applies where the interpretation of the law is con-
cerned: the opinions and interests of anyone but ‘experts’ are virtually
never considered.
To again provide an example from Austria, the Bundesdenkmalamt
(BDA), the National Heritage Agency, has interpreted the provision of §
11 (1) DMSG (e.g. in BDA 2016, 6–20) as if it stipulated that all excava-
tions and other ‘research in situ with the purpose of discovering or examin-
ing’ archaeology ‘may only be conducted with permission of the BDA’ 15
for at least several decades. It insisted on this regardless of whether any
protected archaeological heritage (monuments) or even only (unprotected)
archaeological remains were known or suspected to exist on the property
in question. It has done so despite the fact that § 1 (1) DMSG explicitly
states that ‘The provisions contained in this federal law are applicable to
immobile and portable manmade objects … of historical, artistic or other
cultural significance (‘‘monuments’’), provided their preservation is in the
public interest due to that significance’16, and § 1 (4) DMSG that ‘The
public interest in the preservation in the sense of Abs. 1 (protection)
becomes legally effective by force of legal presumption (§ 2) or by decree
(§ 2a) or by official letter by the Bundesdenkmalamt (§ 3)’ 17. By any fair
interpretation, this must mean that the permit requirement of § 11 (1)
DMSG—which is, after all, a provision of that federal law—can only be
applicable if research is conducted to discover or examine protected monu-
ments (in the preservation of which there is a legally effective public inter-
est): after all, a public interest which is not legally effective cannot trigger
the applicability of a legal provision, since it has no legal force (it cannot
trigger legal action).
Yet, this appears to be considered to be irrelevant by the BDA, despite
the fact that I brought and won two cases against it in the Austrian Federal
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Court of Administrative Appeals (BVwG, decisions: 11.9.2017, W183
2168814-1/2E; 19.9.2018, W 195 2197506-1/11E), challenging that very
interpretation, and there being Supreme Administrative Court case law
directly contradicting the BDA’s interpretation (VwGH, decision:
23.2.2017, Ro 2016/09/0008; cf. Karl 2019a, 8–27). Still, the BDA continues
to interpret this provision as a general permit requirement for all archaeo-
logical fieldwork and reports ‘unauthorised’ fieldwork on sites (in the
preservation of which there is no legally effective public interest) to the
prosecuting authorities for alleged violations of the provisions of § 11 (1)
DMSG. If not even directly conflicting Federal Appellate and Supreme
Court case law on the very point of law can change its interpretation by a
heritage agency, what chances will non-professionals have to exercise their
civil right to conduct research on archaeology (in the preservation of which
there is no legally effective public interest) unhindered by the state and its
officials? None!
Application in the Judicial System
How this interpretation is applied to non-experts in the judicial system can
be demonstrated by an exemplary case from Austria: in 2012, a non-pro-
fessional metal detectorist conducted a search on land on which no archae-
ology is known or suspected to exist. This land is near a known ruin of a
mediaeval castle, in the preservation of which, however, there is no legally
effective public interest either. In his interview with the prosecuting
authority, to which he had been reported by the BDA, he claimed to have
been searching for meteorites, which are not man-made objects and thus
cannot be ‘monuments’ according to the definition of § 1 (1) DMSG. He
also claimed to have made no finds and not to have dug at all (BH Melk,
decision: 23.9.2013, MES2-V-12 10139/5, 2).
His activities had been witnessed by two ‘archaeologists’, one of whom
had reported the case to the BDA. When interviewed by the prosecution,
he stated that he and his colleague had been conducting an archaeological
land survey (research in situ with the purpose of discovering or examining
archaeology) on request of the BDA when spotting two metal detectorists
searching in a field, whom they approached, with the defendant in the case
identifying himself to them by name. They also had—after the detectorists
had left the site—discovered and photographically recorded recently back-
filled holes in the area of the mediaeval ruin. It is not mentioned anywhere
in the interview summary that they actually observed the metal detectorists
having dug any of these (BH Melk, decision: 23.9.2013, MES2-V-12 10139/
5, 2–3). It is also noteworthy in this context that the two ‘archaeologists’ at
the time were still students who had not yet completed their first degree
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and who, as far as I could establish, at this time were also not employees
of the BDA. Thus, they could not legally have been issued with a § 11 (1)
DMSG permit or been covered by the exemption of fieldwork by the BDA
itself of § 11 (2) DMSG.
The summary of the expert opinion the BDA had submitted to the
prosecuting authority in this case after the defendant had been interviewed
(BH Melk 23.9.2013, MES2-V-12 10139/5, 3) indicates that it had argued
that the claims made by him were not credible. It stated that detectorists
would normally search for archaeological finds rather than meteorites, and
that mediaeval castle ruins are known to be productive in finds. However,
as far as can be determined, it neither provided any evidence that the
defendant had actually been searching for monuments, that he had actually
dug any holes or made any finds, nor that any monuments in the preserva-
tion of which there is a legally effective public interest actually exist on the
land he was suspected of or observed metal detecting.
Nonetheless and despite the fact that he had not admitted any wrongdo-
ing, there was no actual evidence that he had committed any wrongful act,
and the principle ‘innocent until proven guilty’ applying in Austria, too,
the detectorist was fined for the offence of having breached the permit
requirement of § 11 (1) DMSG. Since he could not prove a nega-
tive—something which is obviously impossible—the (entirely prejudicial)
‘expert’ opinion of the BDA of the ‘normal’ intentions of metal detectorists
prevailed. The two archaeology students, on the other hand, one of whom
had actually admitted to having conducted archaeological fieldwork despite
not being legally eligible to be granted a § 11 (1) DMSG permit and not
being a BDA employee, were not even reported to the prosecuting authori-
ties by the BDA, nor fined for breaching the very same provision of the
law as the detectorist.
It even seems as if the reporting to prosecuting authorities of cases of
suspected or evident offences against the DMSG by the BDA is generally
highly eclectic and discriminatory. This is not only evident from this par-
ticular case, but even more so from the systematic failure by the BDA to
enforce the law against professional archaeologists who evidently breached
the provisions of § 11 (1) and (6) DMSG. As is evident from the BDA’s
own annual finds reports, of the 1674 fieldwork projects the BDA had per-
mitted according to § 11 (1) DMSG in the years 2013–2015, a total of 89
had not submitted any report by the deadline for submissions to the,
respectively, relevant volume of the FO¨ (52/2013: 35 reports not received;
53/2014: 31; 54/2015: 23). This deadline is two months after the legal dead-
line for the submission of such reports to the BDA stipulated in § 11 (6)
DMSG. Non-submission of the compulsory report by the latter deadline is
an offence under § 37 (3.7) DMSG, punishable by a fine of up to e 5000.
Yet, as far as I could establish, not a single one of these offences by profes-
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sional archaeologists against the DMSG was reported by the BDA to the
prosecuting authorities, despite there being proof positive of the offence
having been committed in each of these cases in the BDA’s own records
(Karl 2019b, 25–8).
Wissen ist Macht18
Whether any of this discourse and expert rule is compliant with the princi-
ple of equality before the law, enshrined twice in Austrian constitutional
law (Art. 7 (1) Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz; Art. 2 Staatsgrundgesetz), seems
somewhat questionable, to say the least. Whether any of it is actually in
the public interest, especially the public interest determined by a free and
open discourse in which citizens have equal opportunities to represent
their own interests, as it should be in a liberal-egalitarian democracy, must
equally be doubted.
Rather, this short analysis has demonstrated that we, as ‘the experts’,
have immense and mostly unchecked power where the determination of
the public interest in archaeology and how it is managed is concerned. Per-
haps not in theory, but most certainly in practice, it is primarily (at least
some of) us archaeologists who determine the core content, the interpreta-
tion, and the execution of archaeological (heritage protection) laws; in
Austria and Germany to the extent that it can be irrelevant whether there
actually is a public interest in the preservation (or study) of the archaeol-
ogy concerned, whether it has become legally effective, and whether other
justified (or even unconditionally constitutionally guaranteed) legal inter-
ests of citizens or other public interests in archaeology are voided by it.
Even convictions of ordinary citizens can be secured for alleged breaches of
heritage legislation without a sliver of actual proof, while ‘good’ archaeolo-
gists are let off without as much as a slap on the wrist even if the archaeo-
logical authorities have proof positive that they committed offences against
heritage law. In some regard at least, it appears as if there is one rule for
us, and another for all others; as if we archaeologists, and especially state
archaeologists, are privileged, while others are discriminated against.
The reason for this lack of discussion and consensus of what public
interest really means is a particular order of the discourse about (the public
interest in) archaeology and heritage management. This order assigns
exclusive authority to ‘experts’ and even among these, mostly a tiny minor-
ity of ‘special experts’ who hold public office. These ‘experts’ are virtually
the only ones who can make their voices heard in the (‘public’) discourse
about heritage, because their opinions are misconstrued both internally
and externally as ‘true’ and their interests accepted by the state and its
other officials as equivalent to the public interest. They also are in an
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extremely privileged position, because due to the structure of the adminis-
trative system, they get to determine not just what the public interest in
archaeology is, but also the legal instruments, as well as their interpretation
and how they are to be applied, with virtually no (effective) checks or bal-
ances. In short, ‘expert’ knowledge equals power.
Since the origins of our discipline and of archaeological heritage man-
agement in the 19th century, this power has been and is still being used
(or rather abused) to almost completely suppress a truly public discourse
of the kind that should be the norm in liberal-egalitarian democracies.
Rather than as citizens, anyone who is not part of the ‘expert’ elite is effec-
tively treated as a subject which is required to listen and obey. Participa-
tory or stakeholder rights, transparency or even only legal certainty may
exist in theory, but in practice, archaeologists largely rule as a kind of Pla-
to’s philosopher king. As such, we seem to see no need to find out, because
we believe to already truly know, what is in the public’s best interest;
which (just by pure coincidence?) happens to be exactly what is our self-
interest. Thus, we believe we may and indeed must enforce it upon our les-
ser qualified subjects, even against their will, by any means necessary (Wat-
zlawick 2001, 102–3).
It may of course be purely coincidental that this is exactly the power
relationship, and also the power imbalance, characteristic for absolutist
monarchies, whose bureaucracies autocratically determined on behalf of
the Emperor what was in the public interest and then enforced their will
on his subjects. But given that there has been ‘a general consensus of all
participating experts since about two centuries’ (Pollak 2011, 227), it seems
more likely it is anything but, especially since it is exactly the power rela-
tionship created and maintained by the Authorised Heritage Discourse,
whose very function it is to deny the legitimacy of any interests other than
those of us ‘experts’ in anything we have claimed as ‘heritage’ (Smith 2006,
29–34). At least in Austria and Germany, at least where archaeological her-
itage is concerned, we (or at least some of us) archaeologists reign abso-
lute, because we have managed to preserve, not so much the archaeology,
but a model of public administration that does not serve the actual public
interest in archaeology, but primarily our self-interest.
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Notes
1. e.g. § 1 (1–2) and 5 (1) Austrian Denkmalschutzgesetz (DMSG); cf.
Bazil et al. 2015, 17–21, 48–9; § 2 (1) and 8 (1) Denkmalschutzgesetz
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg (DSchG-BW); cf. Strobl and Sieche (2010, 71–7,
166–70).
2. ‘Das weitgehende Fehlen einer Diskussion zu den Grundlagen der
archa¨ologischen Denkmalpflege im deutschen Sprachraum beruht auf
einem weitgehenden Konsens aller beteiligten Fachleute seit etwa
zweihundert Jahren,(Pollak 2011, 227).
3. ‘… qua Gesetz im Interesse aller … vor den Zugriffen aller’ (Lu¨th
2006, 102).
4. ‘Nachforschungsvorrecht des Landes‘(Strobl and Sieche 2010, 265).
5. ‘Es wa¨re unsinnig, wenn das Landesamt fu¨r Denkmalpflege sich selbst
fo¨rmliche Genehmigungen ausstellen mu¨sste‘(Strobl and Sieche 2010,
269)
6. ‘Forschungsgrabung‘.
7. ‘Rettungsgrabung‘.
8. ‘Notbergung‘.
9. ‘Erhaltung durch Dokumentation‘.
10. ‘Raubgrabung‘, with the first part of this term, ‘Raub-‘, normally
referring to a crime against moveable property by threatening or
committing a violent act in the German language.
11. ‘Plu¨nderung‘, a term normally referring to the illegal appropriation
of portable property during war or civil unrest in the German lan-
guage.
12. ‘Heimathirsche‘(e.g. Jung 2010).
13. ‘(schwarze) Schafe‘(e.g. Leskovar and Traxler 2011).
14. ‘Die durch die Novelle 1990 vorgesehene Regelung, dass …
Grabungsgenehmigungen auch an Personen vergeben werden ko¨n-
nen, die keine einschla¨gige abgeschlossene universita¨re Ausbildung
haben, wurde, da u¨berholt, gestrichen: es haben sich neue Modelle
unter Leitung voll ausgebildeter Archa¨ologen (bzw. Ur- und Fru¨h-
geschichtler) zwischenzeitig bewa¨hrt‘ (RV 1999, 55).
Authority and Subject
15. The law actually stipulates that excavations and’… research in situ
with the purpose of discovering or examining portable or immoveable
monuments under the surface of the earth or water may only be con-
ducted with permission of the BDA’, ‘‘… Nachforschungen an Ort
und Stelle zum Zwecke der Entdeckung und Untersuchung bewegli-
cher und unbeweglicher Denkmale unter der Erd- bzw. Wasser-
oberfla¨che du¨rfen nur mit Bewilligung des Bundesdenkmalamtes
vorgenommen werden…‘(§ 11 (1) DMSG).
16. ‘Die in diesem Bundesgesetz enthaltenen Bestimmungen finden auf von
Menschen geschaffene unbewegliche und bewegliche Gegensta¨nde …
von geschichtlicher, ku¨nstlerischer oder sonstiger kultureller Bedeu-
tung (,,Denkmale‘‘) Anwendung, wenn ihre Erhaltung dieser Bedeu-
tung wegen im o¨ffentlichen Interesse gelegen ist‘(§ 1 (1) DMSG).
17. ‘Das o¨ffentliche Interesse an der Erhaltung im Sinne des Abs. 1 (Unter-
schutzstellung) wird wirksam kraft gesetzlicher Vermutung (§ 2) oder
durch Verordnung des Bundesdenkmalamtes (§ 2a) oder durch Besc-
heid des Bundesdenkmalamtes (§ 3)…‘(§ 1 (4) DMSG).
18. Knowledge is power.
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